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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 15-3271 
____________ 
 
EVERETT K. TERRY, 
 
                                          Appellant 
 
v. 
 
YEADON BOROUGH; MAYOR DOLORES JONES-BUTLER, IN HER 
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; COUNCIL PRESIDENT ASHER 
KEMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; COUNCILMAN 
JACK BYRNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; 
COUNCILWOMAN FLORENCE MCDONALD, IN HER OFFICIAL AND 
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; COUNCILMAN JOHN HOLDEN, IN HIS 
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; COUNCILWOMAN DEBORAH 
ROBINSON-HOWELL, IN HER OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; 
COUNCILWOMAN DENISE STINSON, IN HER OFFICIAL AND 
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; COUNCILWOMAN NELVA WRIGHT, IN HER 
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY  
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-12-cv-06205) 
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 20, 2016 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
  
(Filed:  September 26, 2016) 
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____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Everett Terry appeals the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of the 
Borough of Yeadon et al. on his Fourteenth Amendment claims. We will affirm. 
I 
 Terry was a part-time police officer for Yeadon from 2002 until 2005, when he 
was hired as a full-time officer. His record of service was by all accounts exemplary and 
he was held in high esteem by his fellow officers and Chief of Police, Donald Molineux. 
But two happy events—his promotion and his wedding—sowed the seeds of his 
termination.  
 Upon being promoted to full-time status, Terry met with Borough Finance 
Director Terri Vaughn to complete paperwork. In the course of completing the forms, 
Terry reported no spouse, which made sense since he was not legally married. But when 
Terry designated his companion Margaret Schmidt as the beneficiary of his life insurance 
policy, Vaughn inquired why he had not listed Margaret as his spouse on his health 
insurance forms. Terry explained that he was not legally married, though Margaret was 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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his wife “as far as [he was] concerned.”1 App. 988. In response, Vaughn told Terry that 
he could list Margaret as his spouse on his paperwork, and he did so.2 
 Five years later, on July 17, 2010, Terry and Margaret formally married. Terry 
uploaded photographs of the ceremony onto his Facebook page shortly thereafter. The 
Facebook photos revealed the couple’s interracial status: Terry is African-American and 
Margaret is Caucasian. Terry alleges he was terminated based on his interracial marriage. 
 Defendants paint a different portrait of the investigation into Terry’s marital status. 
Yeadon Mayor Delores Jones-Butler, an African-American, maintains that her suspicion 
was triggered because while Terry was usually a “very open” person, she had no idea that 
he was to be married until learning of the wedding through hushed office gossip. 
App. 674. This perceived concealment “bothered” Butler and sounded her internal alarm. 
App. 679–80.  
 Butler then asked Chief Molineux whether the ceremony was a marriage or merely 
a renewal of vows. Upon learning that it was the former, she asked for Terry’s personnel 
file and discovered that he had listed Margaret as his spouse on his health benefits forms. 
Further investigation revealed that the Borough had expended approximately $55,000 on 
health insurance benefits for Margaret based on Terry’s inaccurate designation. Butler 
                                              
 1 The couple had been in a relationship since 1989 and had lived together since 
2002. Margaret was legally married to another man during part of her relationship with 
Terry and finalized her divorce in 2007. 
 2 Officer Ronald Kent, also newly hired, witnessed the entire exchange while he 
sat alongside Terry filling out his own paperwork. His testimony supports Terry’s 
account. 
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met with Terry and asked him to resign and repay the money; Terry offered to repay the 
Borough but declined to step down. Butler reported Terry to the Borough Council and 
recommended that his employment be terminated.3 
 The Council held a hearing on the matter during an executive session on 
October 4, 2010, which Terry attended with legal and union representation. Terry 
explained how he came to list Margaret as his spouse well before they were legally 
married, hoping the Council would be sympathetic to the fact that he had been honest 
with the Borough’s Finance Director and was simply following her instructions. 
Following the hearing, Terry received a letter from Butler informing him that he would 
be suspended from October 15 to October 21 (the date of the next regular meeting of the 
Council), whereupon the Council would vote whether to fire him  
 When October 21 arrived, Terry received a phone call from Chief Molineux 
informing him that he could return to work the next day. Terry claims the Council voted 
to retain his employment at the October 21 session, but the record reflects that the 
Council instead voted unanimously to “[t]able the issue until the next meeting.”4 App. 
1206. At that meeting, which took place on November 4, the Council voted 4–1 to 
terminate Terry’s employment. 
                                              
 3 Mayor Butler was responsible for administering the Yeadon Police Department, 
but was not a member of the Borough Council, which is the final authority on the firing 
of employees, including police officers. 
 4 Chief Molineux had been informed by the solicitor’s office that Terry’s 
suspension was lifted—not that the Council had voted to let Terry keep his job.  
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 After exhausting the Borough’s grievance and arbitration process and receiving a 
right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Terry brought 
this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Yeadon Borough, Butler, and seven members 
of the Borough Council, alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal 
protection and due process of law. The District Court entered summary judgment against 
Terry and this appeal followed.5  
II 
 We review Terry’s race discrimination claim under the familiar burden-shifting 
framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973): 
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the 
plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employee’s rejection. Finally, should the defendant carry this burden, the 
plaintiff then must have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its 
true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. 
 
Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). Because the Defendants proffered a legitimate reason for Terry’s 
firing—his wrongful designation of Margaret as his spouse on his health insurance forms 
                                              
 5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s summary judgment 
de novo. Heightened Indep. & Progress, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 693 F.3d 345, 
351 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d 
Cir. 2010)) (“Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the record in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).  
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and the costs incurred by the Borough—we will skip to the final step. See, e.g., Jones, 
198 F.3d at 410 (“Our experience is that most cases turn on the third stage, i.e., can the 
plaintiff establish pretext.”).  
 To survive summary judgment at step three, Terry had to “point to some evidence, 
direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve 
the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious 
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the 
employer’s action.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). We agree with 
the District Court that he failed to do so.  
 First, Terry failed to present any evidence from which a factfinder might 
reasonably conclude that the members of the body that actually fired him—the Borough 
Council—were motivated by racial animus. And although he identifies some different 
treatment of Mayor Jones-Butler and other members of the Council with respect to their 
own improper health insurance reimbursements,6 these officials were elected and not 
subject to termination, and thus they are not similarly situated to Terry. See id. at 765 
(explaining that a plaintiff may survive summary judgment by showing “that the 
employer treated other, similarly situated persons not of his protected class more 
favorably” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, any purported disparate treatment cannot 
serve as a basis for finding pretext.  
                                              
 6 In 2013, the Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission found that Mayor Jones-
Butler and some members of the Council had received improper reimbursements without 
suffering any adverse employment action.  
7 
 
 Moreover, Terry offered no direct or circumstantial evidence from which an 
inference of discrimination could be drawn. When asked about the racial animus of the 
council members who voted to terminate him, Terry could not identify any basis for 
believing that they harbored hostility toward him and voted as they did based on race.  As 
for Mayor Jones-Butler, Terry’s brief on appeal urges—without any support—that the 
interracial nature of his marriage caused her to investigate. Without explanation, he 
rejects her testimony that she scrutinized the situation because she was curious as to why 
Terry would not have been more public with other borough employees and officials about 
his wedding. And while Terry alleges that interracial marriage in the Mayor’s own family 
provides evidence of discrimination, this could just as easily cut the other way. At the 
very least, that some of the Mayor’s family members are involved in interracial marriages 
does not give rise to any inference of discrimination. 
 Nor did the District Court err in rejecting Terry’s due process claim. “To state a 
claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must 
allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures 
available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.’” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 
F.3d 225, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, the process that was required was a 
“pretermination hearing” explaining the evidence against Terry and providing him an 
opportunity to respond. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 
(1985). Such hearings need only allow for “a determination of whether there are 
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reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support 
the proposed action.” Id. at 545–46 (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971)). 
Terry received this process at the October 4 Council hearing. And his contention that 
additional process was required because the Council initially decided to retain him and 
then only later reversed course on November 4 is simply belied by the record.  
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
